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BASF Badische Anilin und Soda Fabriken 
BAuA Bundesanstalt für Arbeitsschutz und Arbeitsmedizin (federal agency of 
occupational safety and industrial medicine) 
BEO Projektträger "Biologie, Energie, Umwelt" (research project manage e t body 
"Biology, energy, environment"), research center Jülich 
BgVV Bundesamt für gesundheitlichen Verbraucherschutz und Veterinärm dizin 
(federal agency for consumer health and veterinary medicine, established 
separately after the dissolution of the BGA in 1994) 
BMA Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales (department of labour and social 
affairs) 
BMBF Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung (department of education and 
research) 
BMG Bundesministerium für Gesundheit (department of health) 
BML Bundesministerium für Ernährung, Landwirtschaft und Forsten (department of 
food, agriculture and forestry) 
BMU Bundesministerium für Umwelt (department of the environment) 
COMPO daughter company of BASF, since 2000 subsidiary of Kali + Salz
DLR German center for aviation and aerospace, research project management body 
"Environmental research and technology" 
NGO nongovernmental organisation 
PTWT Projektträger Wassertechnologie (research project management body "Water 
technology and sludge treatment"), research center Karlsruhe  
UBA Umweltbundesamt (federal environmental agency) 
VCI Verband der chemischen Industrie (association of German chemical industry) 
VDLUFA Verband Deutscher Landwirtschaftlicher Untersuchungs- und 
Forschungsanstalten (association of German agricultural research institutions) 
  
CLMP 4 chlorine 3 methylpyrazole 
DMPP 3,4 dimethylpyrazole phosphate 
DCD dicyandiamide 
ENTEC trade name of fertilizers containing DMPP 
EP environmental policy  
ETP ecology-oriented technology policy 
GLP good laboratory practice 
NI nitrification inhibitor(s) 
NPK nitrogen, phosphate, potassium 
R&D research and development 
 
 Summary 
This case study investigates innovation processes and networks around the 
development and market introduction of a new eco-efficient fertilizer. The innovation 
offers a technical-fix solution to combine effective fertilizer application in modern 
agriculture and horticulture with environmental protection by reducing nitrogen losses 
with the help of ammonium stabilisators that show no significant (eco-)toxicological 
effects. The case study describes the period 1995 - 1999 relevant for this 
environmental innovation. Just those actors with the scientific competences required 
belonged to a loose innovation network which one could expect to participate in a 
cooperative R&D project with rather strict labour division, well coordinated and co-
funded by BASF as its key actor. The innovation process met no serious obstacles in 
its technical and its social dimension, though finally some retardation in its time 
dimension, concerning licensing of the new fertilizer. Willingness to compromise was 
prevalent in case of diverging actor interests, and substantial controversy could be 
hardly found in the whole innovation process. Respective actors in environmental, 
technology, and agricultural policy cared for more or less appropriate framework 
conditions of the innovation project but were hardly involved themselves in the genuine 
innovation network. Technology policy cared for launching and co-fu ing the project 
developing eco-efficient fertilizers especially for economic reasons. Concerning the 
main research question of the case study, no serious attempts of substantive 
interpolicy coordination of environmental policy and ecology-oriented technology policy 
could be identified. 
 
1 Purpose and methodology of the case study 
This case study investigates innovation processes and networks around the 
development and market introduction of the new (eco-efficient) fertilizer type ENTEC.1 
It contains the nitrification inhibitor DMPP (3,4 dimethylpyrazol phosphate), an 
ammonium stabilizer strongly impeding nitrification of the ammonia nitrogen applied as 
fertilizer and therefore allowing to reduce the number of fertilizer dressings, improves 
the utilization of applied nitrogen by the plant, and thus significantly reduces nitrogen 
losses by translocation into soil and leaching into the groundwater as well as 
evaporation into the air. The case study describes the time period 1995 - 1999 relevant 
for this environmental innovation. Its main purpose is to study the role of environmental 
policy and technology policy and their mutual coordination within this innovation 
process (Conrad 2000). 
The study is mainly based on 16 loosely structured interviews with key persons 
involved in this innovation process, either on a face-to-face basis (6 interviews lasting 
between 1 and 3 hours) or by telephone (10 interviews lasting between 15 and 45 
minutes). Furthermore, some literature and documents dealing with the development of 
this fertilizer and its application have been studied (BASF 1999, BASF et al. 1999, 
BMBF/DLR 1999, BMBF/BEO 1999, COMPO 1998, 1999), facilit ted by significant 
background knowledge of the author (Conrad 1990, 1992). Finally, the draft report of 
the case study has been circulated to the interview es for critical reading and 
comments, which have been taken into account according to my personal assessment. 
The interviews were made with representatives of the following institutions (1. figure: 
face-to-face interviews, 2. figure: telephone interviews): BASF (1,2), COMPO (1,0), 
Institute Fresenius (1,0), university Gießen, institute for applied microbiology (0,1), 
technical university Munich/Weihenstephan, agricultural dep rtment (0,1), Free 
university Berlin, chemistry department (0,1), research center Jülich, institute for 
radioagronomy (0,1), BMBF (0,3), BML (0,1), research project management bodies 
"Water technology and sludge treatment", and "Biology, energy, environment" 
(Karlsruhe, Jülich/Berlin) (3,0). 
The details of the innovation process were successively recognised and understood 
during the various subsequent interviews conducted mainly in December 1999, so that 
critical questions about controversial issues and less openly prsented intangibles 
could be posed on a better knowledge basis particularly in the later interviews. 
From a methodological point of view, the demand to perform the (in-depth) case study 
within one month workload necessarily implies limited validity of its results because, 
first, it allows hardly any (systematic scientific) verification procedures beyond 
confronting individual interviewees with diverging opinions of other persons interviewed 
and beyond asking the interviewees for corrections of and critical comments on the 
                                         
1  It has been funded by the EU-Commission as part of the ENVINNO-project (IIUW 1998). 
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draft report.2 Second, analysis of relevant contextual literature on fertilizer markets, on 
types and properties of fertilizers and their different environmental impacts was not 
possible either, so that an assessment of the adequacy of dominant cognitive frames 
underlying the description of the case history as an environmental innovation by the 
key actors could not be performed by for instance comparing them with the cognitive 
frames prevailing in organic farming where mineral fertilizers have to be avoided for 
ecological reasons. Finally, the presentation of the case study on about 25 pages does 
not allow to eventually discuss subtleties and different possible interpretations of the 
innovation processes reconstructed. 
2 The physical and social setting 
This section describes the physical and social setting of the environmental innovation 
studied by pointing out requirement, development, environmental impac , and market 
features and advantages of eco-efficient fertilizers and the available agro-
environmental options to minimize their environmental i pacts. 
Fertilizers are used to stabilize and increase crop yield in agriculture and horticulture. 
Leaving aside the impacts of fertilizer dose, composition and chemical form on plant 
growth and crop yield and quality, the potential main enviromental burden of fertilizing 
stems from their (unintended) negative impacts on the (surrounding) environment by 
reactions in the soil, leaching into ground and surface waters, evaporation in the air. 
For nitrogen (containing) fertilizers, these environmental impactsare essentially due to 
nitrate leaching into soil and water, and emission of ammonia and nitrogenous oxides, 
predominantly NO2 into the air. 
For the farmer or gardener, loss of (nitrogen) fertilizer is not in his interest, but it is 
unavoidable to some degree for reasons of soil and plant chemistry, on the one hand, 
and there is an economy-ecology trade-off involved in fertilizer application because of 
enhanced time requirements for fine-tu d application procedures. 
The development of so-called eco-efficient fertilizers which maximize their absorption 
according to plant needs and minimize losses due to their physico-c emical structure 
should therefore contribute in practice to both less burden to the environment and more 
efficient utilisation of nutrients by crops, if the additional costs do not outweigh these 
gains, and if the use of mineral fertilizers is still considered favourable compared to 
organic fertilizing and natural nitrogen mineralisation in organic farming. The relative 
                                         
2 To give one example: on the flow diagram showing the various steps of product development of 
ENTEC presented by one interviewee, dated December 1999, substance screening of potential NI 
candidates was done during 1995, i.e. before the start of the joint project co-funded by the BMBF, and 
registration of DMPP according to the chemical act happened in 1996/97. However, according to the 
final report delivered in November 1999 and reconfirmed by the central actor BASF AD/E (develop-
ment section of BASF fertilizer division) the main part of substance screening was done in 1996/97 
within the joint project, and registrat on of DMPP happened in 1997/98. This difference is crucial 
because it implies that BASF had not yet detected the promising NI compound decisive for project 
success or failure when the joint project took off. Otherwise, the legitimacy of public co-funding 
necessary testing and monitoring experiments to introduce a new product on the fertilizer market 
could be questioned with good arguments. 
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advantage of these agro-environmental solution options may well vary with the type of 
agriculture pursued, the crops cultivated, and the prevailing agricultural economic and 
agricultural policy framework conditions. 
Apart from agro-technically and environmentally advantageous fertilizer application 
procedures eco-efficient fertilizing can be done by adding nitrification inhibitors (NI) in 
an appropriate manner to nitrogen (containing) fertilizers, that chemically prevent rapid 
nitrification of ammonium (ammonium stabilizers), by coated fertilizers with biologically 
degradable coating materials, that physically protract the diffusion of nutrients out of 
the granulated fertilizer, or by slow release fertilizers, where the nutrients themselves 
because of their chemical form get only soluble by a slowly progressing process such 
as hydrolysis and microbial conversion. 
Whereas these agro-environmental options may well serve their purpose of eco-
efficient utilization of nitrogen (containing) fertilizer, the additional substances have to 
be environmentally compatible, too, in terms of toxicology, eco-toxicol gy, biological 
degradability, residues in crops, leaching, or evaporation into the air. This makes the 
development of eco-efficient fertilizers a demanding task, particularly at competitive 
cost levels. Fertilizers containing nitrification inhibitors (DCD, nitrapryrin (2-chlorine-6-
trichlorinemethylpyridine) as well as coated fertilizers and slow release fertilizers were 
well available on the market since already about two decades, but at rather high costs 
allowing only for specialised fields of application, such as lawns and horticulture. 
At this point the socio-economic conditions and changes of the fertilizer market become 
significant. Fertilizer use has largely stabilised in Europe during the 1980s. Following 
cheap imports from Arabian and East European countries and aggressive market 
penetration by Norsk Hydro, a Norwegian corporation mainly engaged in fertilizers, 
aluminium and pisci- ulture, and participating in oil and gas extraction from the North 
Sea, which therefore disposes of cheap energy supply needed for nitrogen fertilizer 
production, the market has become a very competitive one with declining prices and 
low profit margins in the 1980s with only a few companies being able to remain in the 
fertilizer market. From the 1990s onward, however, particularly East European and 
Russian fertilizer producers equipped with cheap labour and low cost energy supply by 
Russian gas entered the market with very low-price products.3 This led to excessive 
supply on the market about every 5 years and made fertilizer production a losing 
business in Western Europe, especially since 1997. 
In order to follow a path of relatively integrated process management and to avoid 
drastic waste generation of nitrogenous chemicals - in accordance with an environ-
mental management system of responsible care meanwhile established in the company 
-, BASF as the main German fertilizer producer is bound to use nitrogenous intermedi-
ates, such as ammonia or nitric acid, for production purposes because of the overall 
configuration of its production process, that is based to a considerable degree on 
                                         
3 On several occasions the European fertilizer industry successfully asked for EU-market protection 
against dumping by custom fees and import quota that were imposed on some countries for some 
time and partly prolongated, too.
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nitrogen. Therefore, its option to go out of a loss-bringing fertilizer business is severely 
restricted. Under these conditions considerable though limited investments in research 
and development of competitive high-tec  fertilizers as the more or less only available 
option to stay in the fertilizer business make well sense even with currently continuing 
business losses. Without the belief that this type of fertilizer will penetrate future 
markets it would have been hard to justify R&D expenses in a fertilizer business with 
low profit margins, which are comparable to those for much more profitable pesticide 
development. 
Fertilizer development, production, marketing and sale was organised within the BASF 
group in the following way: research and development, agricultural advisory services 
and organising legal registration of (new) fertilizers and corresponding chemicals, as 
well as fertilizer production belong to the corporate division Fertilizers (BASF AD) 
located at Limburgerhof. Fertilizer production is done in five BASF owned plants at 
different sites. Production of specific ingredients such as the newly developed 
ammonium stabilisator DMPP, however, need not be part of this same corporate 
division for reasons of favourable utilisa on of already existing know-how and 
production facilities. Marketing and sales management is divided among different BASF 
units: BASF AD is responsible for ordinary fertilizers mainly applied in agriculture, 
whereas the subsidiary COMPO cares for fertilizer specialties, mainly applied in 
horticulture, viniculture, fruit-culture, nurseries and public greens. With an annual 
turnover of 300 million Euro COMPO has been sold by BASF to Kali + Salz late in 
1999, together with marketing and sales management of ordinary fertilizers for 
agriculture, as part of its outsourcing strategy. Thus, Kali + Salz, which belonged to 
BASF (with more than 70%) in the past and still with less than 25% at present, became 
the second largest nitrogen fertilizer supplier in Europe after Norsk Hydro. These 
corporate characteristics are listed here because COMPO as the main distribution and 
sales channel of the newly developed fertiliz  type ENTEC had to fund the 
corresponding R&D efforts of BASF and therefore played the role of a controlling actor 
in the innovation network, described below. 
3 Case history 
This section describes the history of the environmental innovation of the new fertiliz r 
type ENTEC containing NI, referring to its development, the actors involved in related 
networks, and their interests and motivations. Altogether, it appears to be a successful 
innovation with well working cooperation of the diverse scientific research institutions 
involved and the willingness of the German federal ministries concerned to support this 
innovation process. Environmental compatibility of the new fertilizer was an important 
welcomed side- ffect of the development process in line with legal r quirements and 
with the justification given by the scientific referees evaluating the project proposal in 
1996, but hardly, however, its main driving force. 
The combination of two key concerns initiated the whole project in 1995/96. First, as 
already mentioned, BASF AD was under economic pressure to dvelop and realise a 
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strategy to keep fertilizer sales a profitable business in the longer run. For good 
reasons the production and sale of fertilizer specialities with a high market potential 
was seen as such a strategy. Such specialities are for instance sophisticated nitrogen 
fertilizers of improved quality, high efficiency and limited environmental harm, at still 
competitive costs. Whereas coated fertilizers and slow release fertilizers tend to offer a 
larger profit margin, but only serve niche markets at present, NI containing fertilizers 
have potentially large application areas though with lower profit margins. BASF 
manufactures fertilizers containing NI DCD since 1989, and sells them in cooperation 
with the independent fertilizer company SKW Trostberg at a niche level, however, 
because of their high production costs and limited effectiveness.4 Because BASF is the 
more or less only fertilizer manufacturer in Europe disposing of considerable corporate 
R&D capabilities in this respect, it has potential competitive advantage in developing 
an eco-efficient NI containing fertilizer at reasonable costs. Only Norsk Hydro pursues 
some development of sophisticated fertilizers and fertilizer application strategies in 
Germany, too. In times of losing business, however, available financial resources for 
fertilizer R&D are limited5 so that co-funding by external institutions is likely to be 
welcomed despite stronger duties to disclose details of R&D results.
Second, the head of PTWT at the research center Karlsruhe saw the chance to enlarge 
its domain by a large project increasing its reputation and its financial means, because 
5% of BMBF R&D project money is dedicated to the responsible research project 
management body. In line with the BMBF strategy to concentrate on lead projects, he 
intensely conferred with BASF, on the one hand, and with the BMBF, on the other 
hand. Thus, he contributed to persuade the former to invest further considerable 
resources, even including resources for collaborating institutions, in a R&D project 
implying positive ecological effects and image, which was well in line with a corporate 
strategy of establishing sub tantial environmental management systems and leaving 
the negative environmental image of chemical industry stemming from the late 1980s 
and early 1990s. And he convinced the latter to fund one of the largest BMBF R&D 
projects in order to keep competitiveness of an industry and accordingly employment 
by an environmental innovation.6 He helped to select the cooperating R&D partners for 
the project though these often had already contacts and collaborated with BASF 
previously. In fact, essentially BASF AD/E, the R&D section of the BASF division 
Fertilizers, decided as the key actor of the w ole innovation process which part of the 
project should be done by external partners, mainly for cost-saving reasons, and 
coordinated the whole innovation process. In addition, all specified methods and 
procedures developed by cooperating institutes wihin this R&D project, belong to 
BASF. Furthermore, the research project management body was involved, to some 
degree, in arranging the appropriate project application procedure. The project 
                                         
4 The same holds true for the NI nitrapyrine of Dow Chemical in the USA, which can only be applied 
within liquid fertilizers. 
5 The development of the Haber-Bosch process early in the 20th century, which nearly absorbed the 
capital stock of BASF, would be hardly funded even by a large chemical company at present. 
6 It took this research project management body about one year to convince the BMBF that the project 
was worth funding. 
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proposal had to indicate its probable results and their market potential, and consisted 
of specified working packages of the different project partners.7 
Concerning NI containing fertilizer development, these project participants were and 
still are the following ones:  
– different BASF units, namely ZAG/X (central laboratory unit) supplying new 
molecules and AD/E for screening for active agents as possible NI candidates 
(about 150 different substances taken from chemical classes of pyrozoles, 
imidazoles, pyrimidines, triazoles, thiazoles, pyridines, terpenes, alkines nd 
various urea derivatives), 
– AD/E for further biological screening to determine the effectiveness of all NI 
candidates in laboratory soil experiments, 
– AD/E for open-field-screening of 8 NI candidates left to examine their effectiven ss 
under normal agricultural conditions and the concentration of the then selected NI 
candidates DMPP and CLMP needed in fertilizers under conditions of ordinary crop 
husbandry, 
– AD/E for biological tests to study the influence of DMPP and partly CLMP, too, on 
yield and quality in agriculture and horticulture under normal field conditions, 
– ZHT (central unit for human toxicology) for toxicological as well as DUU (central 
unit for environmental questions), together with Institute Fresenius as external 
contractor for eco-t xicological tests of DMPP8 according to registration 
requirements of the chemical act,
– AD/E and ZET (central unit for technical research) for formulation experiments to 
investigate the optimal way of incorporating DMPP in different fertilizers and their 
respective stability during storage (shelf life), 
– ZAG/X for developing and scaling up of optimal chemical production process
technologies to synthesize DMPP; 
– the private Institute Fresenius for developing and validating analytical methods to 
determine DMPP residues in crops, soil and water, 
– the institute for radioagronomy, research center Jülich for applying radioactive 
tracing methods in lysimeter experiments to study 14C-labelled DMPP and CLMP 
distribution in plants and soil, and in addition the wherabouts of the ammonia 
fertilizer during vegetation, 
– the institute for plant nutrition, Technical university Munich, at Weihenstephan for 
studying the effects of DMPP and CLMP on different crops in dependence of the 
modes of fertilizer application and of soil type, 
– the institute for applied microbiology, university Gießen for investigating the 
impacts of DMPP and CLMP on the emission of gaseous nitrogen compounds into 
the air, on ammonia, nitrate, nitrite, carbon and bacteria population concentrations 
and acidity of soils. 
                                         
7 Whereas the participating university institutes had to supply their own project prop sal in separate 
forms, the Institute Fresenius which received about half of the resources spent outsid  BASF was not 
obliged to do so. 
8 Toxicological and eco-t xicological tests required about 50% of total R&D costs! 
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Furthermore, COMPO participated in the (BASF-internal) steering meetings in order to 
be adequately informed about ongoing development efforts, because as the key future 
sales company of the new fertilizer it had to finance the BASF part of the project and 
therefore had eventual veto-p wer to end the project in case of failure. 
For the other two R&D components of the project, coated fertilizers and slow release 
fertilizers, three other university institutes (chemistry department, Free university Berlin; 
institute for plant nutrition, university Hannover; Fachhochschule (graduate college) 
Weihenstephan) are involved. Their part has not been investigated further in this case 
study. 
There is rather consensus that BASF as the main R&D partner and coordinator of the 
whole innovation project probably would have pursued at best one fertilizer op ion, 
possibly NI containing fertilizers, without additional public funding.
After agreement was reached in principle to launch the project, there was pressure by 
BASF to formulate, to submit and to approve the project proposal (BASF 1996) rather 
quickly for economic reasons. In view of the long duration and the high costs of the 
total project, it was split into two subsequent formally independent projects each 
costing more than 8,5 million Euro, 4.25 million Euro of which are contributed by the 
BMBF9 amounting to formally 50% and in fact about 40% of all R&D costs. Additionally, 
considerable registration costs and the costs of erecting production facilities have to be 
covered entirely by BASF. 
Because market introduction chances were considered to be more rapidly feasible for 
NI containing fertilizers, they were primarily developed and examined during the first 
project (phase) 1996 to 1999 requiring around 90% of project resources, wher as 
coated fertilizers and particularly slow release fertilizers are mainly developed and 
tested in the separate second project (phase) 1999 to 2002. The splitting into two 
projects was mainly due to BMBF policy orientatio  not to make an enormous financial 
commitment of 8,5 million Euro for such a long-term R&D project in favour of an 
industrial product. 
The R&D project developing NI and the corresponding fertilizer type ENTEC was 
primarily coordinated and steered by AD/E (ca. 40 people), and typically organised via 
strong labour division for the various R&D tasks, recurrent BASF-internal project 
meetings (about half a day every 1 to 2 months), and general project meetings of all 
collaborating institutes, including the research project management body a d possibly 
the BMBF, generously hosted by BASF (one day about each half year). 
These meetings served to discuss research results and problems, to integrate these 
results, and to harmonise ongoing research efforts. They were important occasions of 
face-to-face communication, that helped to improve mutual understa ing, to provide 
helpful differing perspectives on specific issues, and to strengthen team spirit by 
personal relationships. The BASF-internal project meetings served the section leader 
                                         
9 One should note that 5% of this sum are attributed to the research project management body as 
administrative costs and therefore not available as genuine research money. 
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of AD/E, who was a chemist till autumn 1999 and now is an agricultural scientist, to 
inform himself and to maintain cotrol over project development. The section leader 
had to convince the division leader of BASF AD that the project requiring considerable 
investment was justified. The general project meetings helped BASF AD/E to keep 
control of and to coordinate project development, and to intervene in case of problems 
arising. The last two project meetings in 1999 served dissemination purposes by a 
colloquium at BASF-Limburgerhof (May 1999) and by a special morning session at the 
annual VDLUFA congress (September 1999) where various aspects of the project were 
presented (BASF 1999, VDLUFA 1999). Apart from these project meetings contact and 
cooperation between project partners occasionally occurred for specific technical 
reasons on an ad-hoc basis, mostly between just two actors. 
Concerning fertilizer development, the crucial agronomical (business-relevant) tasks 
were done by BASF-internal working groups themselves, lading to two patent 
applications concerning NI, and others concerning coated fertilizers and slow release 
fertilizers, too, whereas mainly monitoring tasks or tasks out- ourced for cost reasons10 
or need of special expertise and equipment (lysimeter experiments by research center 
Jülich, developing analytical measuring methods by Institute Fresenius) were done by 
non-BASF collaborators, requiring about 1,5 million Euro, i.e. ca. 20% of all costs. 
As illustrated by the following examples, well functioning project coordination was an 
important task for BASF AD/E, because it allowed well-tim d start of project tasks and 
timely delivery of their results. 
Thus, the screening of many groups of chemical substances for their potential aptness 
as NI involving more than 100 individual substances11 has to proceed (eco-
)toxicological examination and field tests. After these intense screening procedures two 
promising candidates out of the pyrazole group with strong ammonium stabilising 
effects remained: DMP (3,4-dimethylpyrazol) and CLMP (4-chlorine-3-methylpyrazol); 
whereas NI candidates of other classes of chemical substances were cancelled 
because of herbicidal or toxicological effects, respectively. 
After CLMP was rejected because of possible chlorine-related environmental impacts, 
higher production costs and lower efficiency in 1997, most of the subsequent 
monitoring (field) experiments were then made with DMPP in the project. 
Furthermore, DMPP had to be registered according to the German chemical act as a 
new substance. The registration procedure for the basic grade took place without any 
problems in 1997/98.12 Subsequent toxicological studies and registrat on procedures 
                                         
10 On average, one personyear of research amounts to about 1 million Euro in chemical industry, includ-
ing all side costs (e.g. research assistants, workplace, overheads), whereas it amounts to about 
100.000 Euro in private research institutes such as Institute Fresenius, and to about 60.000 Euro in 
university institutes, accounting separately for these also relatively lower additional costs. 
11 Typically for the development of a new pesticide 15.000 to 20.000 substances are screened resulting 
in one good candi ate. 
12 The responsible registration office at the BAuA (Bundesanstalt für Arbeitsschutz und Arbeitsmedizin, 
subordinate to the federal ministry of labour BMA) receives and checks the submitted registration 
documents according to occupational safety, health and environmental aspects. If their is no objection 
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for the first grade of the chemical act, which refer to production volumes above 100 
tons per year, happen in 2000, whereas the second grade must be only envisaged 
when production volumes above 1.000 tons per year are reached. 
Finally, market introduction of ENTEC - and the planning and construction of 
corresponding fertilizer production plants for this purpose - required (national) 
registration in corresponding EU countries, such as by amendment to the fertilizer 
ordinance in Germany. In this case, (unintended) retardations in the amendment 
process led to about one year delay in market introduction in Germany, whereas the 
process was quicker in Spain, where ENTEC fertilizers were already successfully sold 
in 1999. 
The various components of the R&D project could be dealt with as rather separate 
tasks by the different project partners, listed above, and they all led to substantial 
results required for successful performance of the innovation process. Without going 
into the details of these individual project components, the following features appear 
worthwhile mentioning because it was a successful project at several levels. 
1. As it looks like, all scrutinizing procedures turned out to be in favour of DMPP, be it 
inhibiting effects, effective processing technology of DMPP synthesis, no (serious) 
toxicological and eco-t xicological impacts, biodegradability, little nitrate wash-out, 
little emission of gaseous nitrogen compounds. To have more or less only positive 
physical, chemical and biological effects of a new substance is rather the exception 
than the rule. There exist well examples where the development of new substances 
or processes was already far advanced and then still stopped because of 
toxicological findings. 
2. Communication and cooperation between the various actors involved in the 
innovation process worked well due to mutual acquaintance, common overall R&D 
objective, clear distinct tasks and responsibilities for different institutions, effective 
coordination by BASF13, and favourable attitudes by relevant public authorities, 
essentially BMBF and BML. Controversy did not play any significant role. 
3. Within BASF there was a good fact-oriented working atmosphere at the level of 
actual R&D-related activities, and personal intrigues and power games were - apart 
from the dimension of (self)presentation techniques - at best relevant at higher 
levels of corporate hierarchy. 
4. Favourable situational circumstances facilitated the rapid development and market 
introduction of ENTEC fertilizers. For example, (initial) production of DMPP was 
                                                                                                                              
within a fixed period the registered substance is approved registered without further notice to the 
applicant. 
13 For instance, BASF AD/E helped collaborating university institutes in providing additional means for 
measurement equipments needed for residue analysis. Furthermore, BASF AD/E arranged coopera-
tion of Agrostat, a private institute doing agricultural field tests, with Institu e Fresenius, because 
Agrostat was cheaper than Institute Fresenius and possesses the GLP seal (good laboratory practice) 
in contrast to BASF AD. As a consequence, Agrostat carried out field trials, and the crop and soil 
samples were shipped to Institute Fresenius for residue analysis. Because field tests by Agrostat were 
not foreseen in the project proposal, this additional research was funded by shifting financial means. 
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possible in an already existing BASF plant for pesticide production lowering 
production costs. Internal reorganisation of environmental rse rch policy in the 
BMBF between 1994 and 1997, implying a change of the responsible research 
project management body, too, did not lead to complications or delays in the 
innovation process itself. 
5. Apart from an unintended one year delay in registration procedures in Germa y, 
market introduction of a newly developed fertilizer after about 4 years of research 
and development can be judged as quite rapid. It may offer a viable option for 
BASF to remain an important fertilizer producer on the (European) market offering 
farmers and gardeners sophisticated eco-efficient fertilizer (systems) at reasonable 
costs. 
Apart from some left-overs to be completed in the second project phase, the research 
project on NI containing fertilizers ended in 1999 with the presentation of its results on 
scientific conferences and in the final report to the research proje t management body 
(BASF et al. 1999). The amount of manpower, financial and technical resources 
invested varied between the different participating resea ch groups. Typically, however, 
around 3 to 4 scientists, including assistants, were involved, spending between 1 and 5 
personyears on the project. Prominent were all kind of field tests lasting between 1 and 
3 years.14 
Planning and erecting production plants for NI containing fertilizers at different 
locations (Gijon, Spain; Krefeld, Germany; probably a further one in Antwerpen, 
Belgium and one in Italy) started in 1997 and 1998, respectively. Similarly, preparatory 
efforts for market introduction began in 1997, too. Since 1999, the new fertilizer type 
ENTEC is sold in Spain. In Germany, Italy and France as the other large national EU 
markets, as well as subsequently in the Netherlands and Austria, sale started in 2000. 
When a R&D project turns out to be so successful, points of suboptimal progress or 
failure are of special interest in order to avoid ideal-typ  conclusions about a real world 
project. Few can be mentioned, where only the first one stems from the R&D project 
itself: 
1. As requested Institute Fresenius developed analytical methods for the determina-
tion of DMPP residues in water, soil and different crops in 1996. The residue 
methods were designed to allow rapid sample throughput along with maximum 
sensitivity and selectivity. However, the university institutes collaborating in the 
project did not have sufficient funds for investing in corresponding measuring 
instruments. Therefore, after a meeting on this problem, Institute Fresenius 
developed a further technique to analyse soil residues with minimal requirements in 
1998 for these institutes which adapted it further for their specif c purpose, 
supported with some additional means by BASF. However, these cheaper methods 
of analysis are only acceptable on the basis of cheap laboratory labour costs, and 
                                         
14 Already more than 600 field experiments testing DMPP effectiveness were performed by BASF in 
different countries, around half of them in Germany. 
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therefore not competitive on the market outside acadmia. This experience, 
frustrating for all parties, was due to missing check of available instrumentation and 
resources before the start of the project and can be voided by early inventory in 
similar (cooperative) projects. 
2. When perspectives for the new NI containing fertilizer appeared favourable, BASF 
asked the BML for ENTEC registration according to the fertilizer act in 1997. After 
registration of the active agent DMPP according to the German chemical act, a new 
type of fertilizer needs admission by the fertilizer ordinance. The corresponding 
scientific advisory board of the BML has to examine if it is not harmful to human 
health and the environment, and beneficial for the crop and soil as required by the 
fertilizer act. The advisory board, meeting twice a year, had few comments in 
October 1997, which were fulfilled in April 1998. Because the BML planned a more 
general amendment to the fertilizer ordinance within 6 months in 1998 (concerning 
secondary raw materials, human waste and compost), it intended to include 
registration of the new fertilizer type in this amendment. However, consultation and 
negotiation processes went on and on, and early in 1999 the BML admitted that the 
general amendment would be passed in 2000 at the earliest.15,16 Meanwhile BASF, 
interested in quick registration, lobbied in favour for a special amendment of the 
fertilizer ordinance to allow registration of an environmentally friendly fertilizer.
Additional pressure came from the BMBF which funded the project. In view of these 
circumstances the BML accepted this pathway of two separate amendments and 
worked rapidly in a cooperative manner to launch this special amendment. This 
happened in November 1999, after the BMU and BMG had been consulted, after 
the upper house of parliament (Bundesrat)had given its approval, and after the EU 
notification procedure of technical standards at Brussels had been passed after 
three months obligatory waiting time17, all in accordance with legally required 
provisions. 
3. Whereas for other substances, for instance pesticides, national registration often 
implies registration for the EU as a whole if its requirements are as strict as EU 
requirements, this does not hold for fertilizers.18 There exists the option of direct 
registration according to EU law, too, avoiding many parallel national admission 
procedures. However, representatives of the various member states basically form 
the corresponding EU registration committee, who tend to reinsure their position by 
national governmental institutions and therefore to insist on examination according 
to national regulations, which leads to multiple similar testing and monitoring 
procedures in several countries. The French regulations, in particular, tend to 
                                         
15 Due to their (naive) reliance on initial BML informations transmitted to them, these imponderable 
delays in registration procedures because of ongoing political bargaining processes were not correctly 
perceived by COMPO marketing people, in particular, keen on rapid market introduction of ENTEC 
fertilizers. 
16 In autumn 2000 it was clear that this amendment will be passed in 2001 at best. 
17 In case of additional inquiries, the waiting time is 6 months. In this case of DMPP containing fertilizer, 
however, no objections were raised. 
18 With very few fertilizer producers left in the EU, essentially BASF and Norsk Hydro, there is 
insufficient lobby and pressure to change these legal registration conditions. 
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demand repetition of all field testing already done elsewh re.19 On average, only 
large corporations, having sufficient resources and informal contacts to key 
persons, are able to afford this expensive procedure. Therefore, it was 
advantageous for BASF to ask in parallel for national registration of NI containing 
fertilizers in several countries, namely Spain, Italy, Germany, France, Austria and 
Benelux, which allowed quicker market introduction on the national markets, 
respectively, than by the EU-wide registration procedure. 
4. Lastly, German environmental policy includes some legal restrictions concerning 
nitrate standards (EU nitrate ordinance, nitrate threshold value of EU and national 
drinking water ordinance, farming restrictions in water protection zones, animal 
manure ordinances) and climate policy objectives to reduce emission of 
greenhouse gases (CO2, NOx, NH3). However, it does not provide clear market 
incentives (e.g. a nitrogen tax), regulatory framework conditions (e.g. differentiated 
restrictions of fertilizer application), and up to now little suitable information material 
to agriculture to prefer utilization of eco-efficient fertilizers.20 
4 Actors: their interests, perceptions, strategies and constellation 
The actors involved in the case investigated can be defined at two levels: organi ations 
and individuals. Because the various individuals in principle acted according to the 
rules and interests of their organisational units and because personal conflicting issues 
within these units had no observable impact on the case history, in general21, it s ems 
sufficient to analyse actor behaviour and constellation at the level of organisational 
units, although this does not deny the key role of certain individuals for the specific 
development path of the case history. Thus, organisational sub- nits within a macro-
organisation such as BASF, BMBF, or a university are conceived of as essential actors, 
where typically around 5 to 15 individuals belonging to this unit were engaged in the 
case investigated. 
The overall actor constellation may be plausibly described as a R&D-oriented 
innovation network, consisting of two overlapping groups of actors within and outside 
BASF. The first group namely Various units of AD/E involved in laboratory experiments, 
agrochemical testing, and product development, and some central units of BASF and 
COMPO belonged to the first group, whereas the various (research) institutes listed 
belonged to the second group, namely Fresenius, Agrostat, the institutes at the 
research center Jülich and at the universti s of Gießen and Weihenstephan. Further 
actors involved in the case outside the genuine innovation process were 
                                         
19 Apart from emphasis on national self-reliance this is due to motives of market protection of national 
producers. 
20 In France, for instance, manure supplemented by liquid NI can be applied for some extra weeks in 
winter, which should have positive environmental impacts even if only 50% of the farmers follow this 
regulation. 
21 For instance, the specific kind of relationship of a candidate for a doctor's degree with his supervising
professor should usually have only marginal impacts on the overall R&D project. 
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– other BASF units, responsible for producing or marketing the new NI containing 
fertilizer as well as leading managers approving the project, 
– the technology policy units, i.e. the responsible BMBF section and the research 
project management body, funding and evaluating the project,
– and the regulatory agencies of the BML, its scientific advisory board, the BMU, the 
BgVV, the Bundesrat, and the EU-Commission, all involved in the legal registration 
of the eco-efficient fertilizer. 
Apart from the university institutes at Berlin and Hannover, and the Fachhochschule 
Weihenstephan,  involved in the other wo components of the eco-efficient fertilizer 
project, some other actors may have taken notice of the project in its later stage, such 
as agricultural and environmental departments at the state level, or agricultural 
organisations, or agro-chemical industry corporations. Furthermore, it should be noted, 
that neither environmental ministries (apart from registration procedures), nor 
environmental NGOs, nor eco-farming groups, potentially opposed to the project, were 
directly involved in the project. However, environmental policy (regulations) and 
environmental concern of the public, represented by these actors in particular, were 
important boundary conditions inducing this innovation effort. 
Clearly, the key actor was the AD/E section of BASF who coordinated a d controlled 
the whole R&D project and cared for registration procedures, too. No other actor had 
the same overall know-how and steering competence. The other research institutes 
received their research funds and delivered their res arch results, but were neither 
involved in the initial launching of the project nor in the registration procedures of the 
new fertilizer. The other political or economic actors involved had some veto-power 
concerning project funding (leading managers of the BASF fertilizer division, BMBF, 
COMPO) or NI and fertilizer registration (BAuA, BML, EU-Commission), but obviously 
did not belong to the genuine innovation network. 
Because (parallel) competing R&D efforts did not exist, and because the actors 
proceeded according to their exp cted role and accepted existing framework 
conditions22, actor interests, perceptions and strategies were rather well 
accommodated to and harmonised with each other so that controversial attitudes or 
even fundamental oppositions could be hardly observed. Rather, the respective 
interests and strategies were considered mutually legitimate. Genuine objectives and 
actual substantive strategies and activities followed by each actor were well reconciled 
reflecting a positive coupling of his formal and substantial interests. Because the 
screening process of promising NI-candidates was already well advanced at the start of 
the joint R&D project in 1996, all the actors (of the innovation network) were interested 
in successfully completing the development of an eco-efficient fertilizer so that their 
own R&D work could be counted as a success, too. 
In more concrete terms, the AD/E section of BASF was interested in  
                                         
22 For instance, according to the contract between BASF and Institute Fresenius, the analytical methods 
and all results obtained belong to BASF. Institute Fresenius is not allowed to use these methods 
elsewhere without prior permission of BASF. 
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1. developing a new NI and the corresponding fertilizer, 
2. receiving co-funding by public money, 
3. solving the central R&D questions itself, 
4. having external collaborating research teams with specific (monitoring) 
competences required, at probably cheaper costs than by corresponding BASF-
internal testing and monitoring efforts, 
5. steering the overall R&D project, 
6. and managing rapid registration of the new substance DMPP and the new DMPP 
containing fertilizer type ENTEC in order to allow for short-term market introduction. 
All these (strategic) steps can be considered necessary requirements for BASF to 
remain as a competitive producer in the fertilizer market. 
For the different academic research institutes the joint R&D project offered the 
opportunity to get funds for following their genuine research orientation by doing the
various monitoring experiments required for DMPP application, resulting in scientific 
publications and dissertations. 
Institute Fresenius as a private company has to sell its competences on the market. It 
was paid by BASF for the development and validation of analytical methods, as well as 
for the analysis of DMPP residues and metabolites. Participation in the project offered it 
both the acquisition of contracts and the extension of its know-how in this working field. 
The actors in charge of funding and supervising the project, namely both COMPO and 
the two subsequently responsible research project management bodies have been 
clearly interested in its success because failure of an innovatio  project usually implies 
loss of funds invested. 
The BMBF pursues the tasks of promoting national industries and of assisting 
environmental technology development mainly by co-funding corresponding R&D 
projects. The development of eco- fficient fertilizers suited this purpose well. Thus, the 
BMBF agreed to appropriate the extraordinarily large sum of 8,5 million Euro for this 
R&D project. 
The registration authorities have to check the different safety features of DMPP and of 
the new fertilizer according to their criteria and rules of registration, but have no 
interest in unnecessarily delaying permission in case of positive re ults of the licensing 
procedures. 
The perceptions of the innovation process by the various actors certainly differed in 
terms of their respective know-how and focus of task, but not with respect to its agreed 
upon overall objective. Therefore, the Thomas-Theorem23 is of no significant 
importance to explain different (conflicting) actor strategies. In this case its relevance 
just stems from a consensual perception and corresp nding problem definitions that 
largely contribute to the relatively harmonious and conflict-free proceeding over more 
or less all phases of the innovation process. Without this common problem perspective 
this process probably would have followed another pathway. 
                                         
23 If man defines a situation as real, it will be real in all its consequences. 
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To sum up, the actor constellation of the case investigated can be chracterised by one 
key actor, by a genuine innovation network of scientific actors, who followed an overall 
common objective, who had a similar science-oriented perspective, and who 
successfully cooperated under conditions of strict division of labour, and by policy-
related actors with other (formal) duties and no genuine scientific interest, however with 
a rather favourable attitude towards the R&D project and its results. Thus, conflict 
between actor interests, perceptions, or strategies did not play any major role. In 
addition, this cooperative situation was supported by the successful results of the 
various R&D efforts themselves so that no critical points of potential project failure had 
to be mastered. 
5 The innovation process and related networks 
Having described actor strategies and constellation, this section inquires into the main 
features and network character of the environmental innovation under study. 
The development of a new NI containing fertilizer can be assessed as a considerable 
incremental technical product innovation24 leading to manifold (subsequent) 
organisational and production (re)arrangements, too. The innovation process itself 
followed a relatively clearly structured sequence of R&D steps: screening of 
substances, systematic testing of NI candidates, developing fertilizer formulae, 
preparing and organising fertilizer registration, production and market introduction. 
Thus, the innovation process is characterised by the overlap of various R&D efforts, 
strong labour division with separate indiv dual research and monitoring results, 
integrated by joint meetings of the R&D groups and by BASF coordinating the project. 
Basically, the new DMPP containing fertilizer is a technical-fix solution within 
established agricultural systems and practices and does not require deeper changes in 
agricultural arrangements. It is, however, a clearly preventive solution of nitrogen-
related environmental hazards independent of specific agricultural systems, as long as 
mineral fertilizers are considered a necessary ingredient of (modern) agriculture. 
Because the crucial element of the innovation was the detection of an appropriate NI 
candidate in the screening process, the subsequent testing and monitoring experiments 
in the co-funded collaborative R&D project were of a more routine character in terms of 
scientific discovery, once DMPP has been selected as NI, though with still 
unforeseeable results. Therefore, the innovation pathway clearly followed a 
foreseeable technological trajectory (cf. Nelson/Winter 1982), where the actors had not 
to expect extraordinary new development paths, though anytime R&D results leading to 
a project-stop. 
The (economic, political, legal, agrochemical) selection environment largely determine  
the steps to be taken, where it has to be considered as good luck that no substantial 
complications arose and all relevant selection criteria possbly terminating the project 
                                         
24 Although a new chemical substance has been found as ammonium stabilisator, it has to be judged 
rather an incremental than a basic innovation. 
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were met. Thus, various social, legal, market embedding dimensions were crucial for 
the innovation to become a success. Significantly, central R&D tasks remained within 
BASF, whereas particularly these embedding dimensions were handled by (external) 
partners, insofar they required R&D (monitoring) efforts. Thus, what makes the whole 
development of a new NI containing fertilizer an innovation, and not just a research 
project25, is the coordinated integration of results in a technological trajectory leading to 
a market product. 
One may reasonably speak of a real innovation network following a joint objective with 
substantial and coordinated exchange of research ideas and results, and with little con-
flict and competition among the network members. However, (in this case) one should 
not overburden the network concept: essentially, it just denominates problem-oriented 
cooperation with specified tasks and rules for a common goal. The innovation network 
consisted of several groups, which discussed R&D results and decided on future steps 
in regular meetings, well coordinated by BASF as central actor. These groups were 
typically composed of few persons. Partly, they already knew and even had some 
positive collaboration experience with personnel of the BASF fertilizer division. 
Furthermore, separate loose networks such as the regulatory (registration) network 
existed, as indicated above. 
Addressing the ecological dimension of this environmental innovation, envirom tal 
compatibility of the new NI containing fertilizer was an important requirement for the 
innovation process, which is reflected by various project tasks undertaken. However, as 
indicated above, environmental concern was hardly the main motivation of all actors 
participating in the project. Instead, the main motivation was the development of a new 
competitive product, the pursuit of interesting research objectives, economic 
competitiveness of German industries, or avoidance of political troubles due to 
insufficient registration procedures. It is due to the coupling of environmental tasks with 
these various social concerns and respective motivations that environmental 
compatibility strongly mattered in this R&D project. 
Lastly, one may ask about the significance of contextual framework conditions 
favourable for successful environmental innovation, i.e. in particular sociostructural 
anchorage of both environmental management and innovat ve orientation of the actors 
involved. At least since the 1990s, BASF follows the responsible care strategy 
promoted by the association of German chemical industry VCI (VCI 1999) and has 
established an environmental management system in most of its facilitie , that provides 
favourable corporate conditions for developing eco-effi ient fertilizers within BASF. 
Secondly, due to the genuine (organisational) interests and objectives of the actors 
involved in the project, research and development are perceived as typical and main 
options to fulfil these con erns and therefore followed as routine device, and therefore 
are substantively embedded as actor orientation, without which R&D efforts would have 
been pushed less. Again, it is important to note that BASF is one of the few fertilizer 
manufacturers with significant R&D capacities. 
                                         
25 For instance, this case study of an environmental innovation is part of a research project only. 
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Thus, environmental management and innovation orientation tend(ed) to provide 
favourable contextual framework conditions to develop eco-efficient fertilizers. 
6 The role of policies and interpolicy coordination 
In accordance with the general objective of the ENVINNO-project (IIUW et al. 1998), 
the role of environmental policy (EP), ecology-oriented technology policy (ETP) and 
corresponding interpolicy cooperation is of special interest for the case studies of 
environmental innovations, which had to be completed. 
It can be clearly stated that EP was only indirectly involved in the innovation process by 
setting structural framework conditions via environmental legislation and regulation, 
typically decided upon in the past, namely nitrate standards of ground and drinking 
water, restrictions for agricultural practices in water protection zones, climate policy 
objectives of reducing NOx and NH3 emissions, and, at the actor level, by deciding 
upon the registration of new chemical substances according to the chemical act 
(registration office of the BAuA). Thus, one may conclude that EP, by transforming 
environmental concerns into formally binding rules and standards, to some degree sets 
incentives in favour of eco-efficient fertilizers, and judges their environmental 
compatibility, too. 
However, essentially severe competition on the fertilizer market and the perspective of 
a new cost-effective fertilizer because of reduced nitrogen losses and lower number of 
fertilizer applications needed, and hardly environmental regulation were the main 
reasons why BASF invested in a corresponding joint R&D project instead of relying 
further on the market niche with already existing DCD containing fertilizers. 
ETP was more directly involved in the innovation process than EP by launching and 
extending the project via extensive co-funding, and by offering some help in finding 
cooperation partners. However, substantive coordination of the project itself rests with 
BASF, whereas BMBF and particularly its subordinate resea ch project management 
body (BEO since 1998) survey and evaluate project progress and results, and still 
could eventually stop it, after the basic decision to fund it had been taken. Thus, 
successful results of the first project (1996- ) certainly helped to decide in favour of 
funding the second project phase (1999-2002) as well. 
Under these conditions EP/ETP interpolicy cooperation cannot be expected at the actor 
level, except for mutual regard of relevant policies, i.e. ETP being aware of 
environmental standards and EP taking notice of ETP efforts towards developing eco-
efficient fertilizers. 
In addition, interpolicy coordination played some role at the structural and actor level 
by BML involvement, issuing a new fertilizer ordinance amendment. Here the BML had 
to evaluate agro-environmental criteria of the new fertilizer, and the BMBF made 
additional pressure in favour of a separate quick amendment, because it was interested 
in an economic success of its project, which is also time dependent. 
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As concerns EP/ETP coordination, in view of the clear project objective it is justified to 
ask what advantage additional EP-involvement and EP/ETP coordination could have 
brought. As long as environmental regulation was clearly given and as long as the 
relevant policy decision was mainly one of project funding, such advantages seem 
implausible, combined with typical disadvantages of additional bureaucratic 
coordination efforts. 
If for situational reasons, UBA - as research project management body subordinate to 
the BMU - would have funded the project, what is unlikely because of the amount of 
funding required, this would have implied another funding institution, but hardly a 
significant structural change concerning EP/ETP coordination. In view of the regulatory 
obligations of EP, the BMBF as the ministry mainly responsible for ETP tends to have a 
better recognition as neutral sponsor for industry than the BMU as the ministry setting 
environmental standards. 
However, to state unnecessary EP/ETP cooperation at the level of well specified R&D 
projects does not imply to see no options for improving EP/ETP coordinati n at the 
level of relevant framework conditions, for instance via environmental taxes or rules for 
water protection zones. Here, better interpolicy coordination would be well feasible, as 
stated by some interviewees. For instance, a nitrogen tax on fertilizers, that would 
support the use of eco-efficient fertilizers, has been discussed since the 1980s (cf. 
Conrad 1990) and has also been introduced in some EU-countries. Partly, the reason 
for this deficit of German EP lies in the limited power and the (past) deregulation 
orientation of the BMU in the former conservative government. 
7 Interpretation perspectives 
Looking at the interaction dynamics of structural, institutional, actor, situational, 
problem perspective and strategic capability factors, which ultimately determine the 
innovation process, these factors can be summarized as follows: 
Structural framework conditions refer to the manifold (contextual) settings that influence 
the direction and evolution of social processes independent of actors' (current) 
articulation of interests and modes of procedure. Concerning the environmental 
innovation of competitive, NI containing, fertilizers, these structural framework 
conditions relate in particular to the domains of ecology and health, economics, 
corporate organisation and culture, law, politics and administration, general 
sociocultural conditions, and the (national) i novation system. Without going into their 
in principle endless description, I summarise key contextual settings already described 
in previous sections. 
Environmental and health problems and corresponding sociopolitical concerns do 
matter in two respects: as a background concern for reducing emission of nitrogen 
compounds into air, soil, water and as strict (eco-) toxicological criteria deciding upon 
admission or rejection of a (new) chemical substance/product. 
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The situation and future perspectives of the fertilizer market in combination with the 
nitrogen based pattern of BASF's production process are key (economi ) determinants 
of BASF strategy to develop NI containing fertilizers. 
For corporate organisation and culture of BASF an established regard of environmental 
management and responsible care, a still comparatively long-term time horizon of 
company strategy and expected returns on investment, and considerable R&D 
capacities, including agricultural research and services at Limburgerhof, tend to act in 
favour of developing eco-efficient fertilizers, too. 
The relevant legal, political and administrative conditions have been dscribed above: 
in particular they concern registration procedures, promotion of environm tal 
technology development supporting competitiveness of German idustries, and the 
willingness to delegate management of publicly co-funded R&D projects to participating 
corporations. 
General sociocultural conditions26 typically tend to play the role of background 
variables which may have favoured, for instance by environmental awareness and by a 
pragmatic combination of participatory orientation and leadership acceptance of the 
main actors involved, but hardly directly influenced the innovatio  process. 
The German landscape of R&D institutions and technology policy arrangements offered 
in this case relatively appropriate preconditions for a cooperative R&D project of 
corporate and academic institutions funded jointly by BASF and the BMBF. This 
institutional setting might well have been confronted with more organisational and 
ideological problems some decades ago. The research capacities required were 
available, though often only once in this case, and with some deficits of university 
institutes in their equipment with modern instrumen ation. 
At the level of an institutional eigendynamic27, the overall environmental innovati n 
process can be reconstructed to a considerable degree as the relatively conflict-free 
combination or juxtaposition of institutionally impregnated developm nt paths. This 
(independent) institutional eigendynamic stems from (central) underlying (formal) 
organisational interests and should therefore be seen as main driving force of the 
innovation process. These organisational iterests can be listed as the following 
continuous scientific, as well as economic and political concerns: 
– eigendynamic induced by the common project goal to develop an environm tally 
sound and efficient NI containing fertilizer 
                                         
26 One may list here the modernization capacity of a society, the importance of the state and public 
policy, the importance of public debate and the equivalent strength of civil society, the extent of 
division into different social classes or strata, the degree of public participation and socio-structurally 
entrenched substantive democracy, the significance of self-responsibility and liability of social actors, 
the degree of legalism, decentralized versus centralized (political) culture and decision-making 
procedures, the importance of postmaterialistic value orientations, environmental awareness of, and 
behaviour by, main actors and the population in general, and the significance and social influence of 
environmental NGOs. 
27 This term means to the (social) dynamics induced by the vested interests, sunk costs, and inertia of a 
system, institution, or group, once it has become firmly established and develop d its own 
momentum. 
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– continuation and expansion of the existing agricultural research program of 
Weihenstephan 
– continuation and expansion of the microbiologically oriented agricultural research 
program at Gießen university 
– further development and application of radioactive tracing methods in combination 
with stable isotope techniques of the research center Jülich 
– development of further analytical measuring methods by Institute Fresenius 
– regaining a competitive edge in the fertilizer market by BASF 
– promoting competitiveness of German industries by technology policy via co-
funding promising R&D projects 
– reorganisation of ETP-related units in the BMBF 
– self-interest of research project management bodies to keep and to expand the 
scope of their funding domains 
– eigendynamic of the registration procedures due to the interests of poli ical actors 
to keep their competences and veto-powers: BML, federal states, EU-Commission, 
other national registration authorities. 
Furthermore mention should be made of the eigendynamic induced by nitrate 
standards for surface, ground and drinking waters and growing restrictions on the 
emission of gaseous nitrogen compounds into the air as increasingly important 
environmental background requirements, and, at the same time, by agricultur l 
lobbying to keep favourable conditions for agriculture with respect to fertilizer costs and 
environmental regulations. 
The actor constellation can be summarised by overlapping knowledge/research, 
business, and regulatory networks (see van Dijken et al. 1999) with the BASF AD/E 
section as central actor in all three networks, namely coordinating and partly 
performing itself the R&D project, being involved in preparing roduction and market 
introduction of the new fertilizer type ENTEC, and caring for its registration at national 
and EU levels. The various actors involved need not be listed once more. Of crucial 
importance was the rather conflict-free collaboration of the actors, partly due to strict 
labour division and lacking competition, on the one hand, and the well organised 
planning and management of the whole innovation process by BASF AD/E, on the 
other hand, avoiding unnecessary delay and research work. 
Important situational factors influencing the innovation process, not attributable to 
predominant (structural) framework conditions, were the following nes: 
1. Favourable conditions led to the initiation of the project: The former head of the 
PTWT perceived the project as a good opportunity to serve interests of both the 
BMBF and the research project management body. This coincided with the acute 
pressure of fertilizer market conditions on BASF to search for new fertilizer options. 
And this coincidence was realised by him, having manifold good contacts to 
industrial cooperations. 
2. The non-appearance of substantive complications in the development process 
concerning various criteria of agricultural efficiency and environmental compatibility 
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of DMPP containing fertilizers can be seen as good luck, and cannot be achieved 
by careful planning of the innovation process because of its very nature of 
uncertain outcomes. 
3. Few negatively judged events, described above in s ction 3, accompanied the R&D 
project, that might have been partly circumvented by improved planning and 
communication procedures. Apart from deficient measuring equipment of university 
institutes, primarily the one-year delay of registra ing the new fertilizer because of 
the planned but delayed major amendment of the fertilizer ordinance, that had 
nothing to do with the innovation itself, had at least a partly negative economic 
impact because of later market introduction of fertilizers type ENTEC in Germany 
than intended. 
4. Furthermore, potentially problematic situational circumstances had no negative
impact on the innovation process: neither the reorganisation of the BMBF with a 
change in the responsible research project management body, nor the forced arly 
retirement and subsequent replacement of the head of the BASF AD/E section 
played any significant role in this respect.  
As described above, the innovation process is characterised by a common problem 
perspective, where each actor pursued his institutional duty. This gen ral problem 
perspective can be identified as the development of an eco-efficient NI containing 
fertilizer competitive on the fertilizer market as a technical-fix solution for a high-tech 
oriented agriculture, that reduces the environmental burden due to agriculture and fits 
the requirements of existing enviromental and health legislation. Differing (opposing) 
problem perspectives and solution strategies, as for instance advanced by organic 
farming and critics of industrialised agriculture, played no role in the innovation process 
and related discourse.28 
Lastly, the rather pronounced strategic capability of BASF in managing innovations 
together with well established traditions in agricultural know-how, services, and 
contacts helped the AD/E section to manage such a publicly co-funded cooperative 
R&D project and to be accepted as its natural coordinator by the collaborating 
institutions. 
As can be concluded with some plausibility from this description of essential determi-
nants of actor strategies and the innovation process, their superposition should be 
more or less sufficient to explain the rather straightforward and successful development 
of the new DMPP containing fertilizer type ENTEC and its introduction on European 
markets. To refer furthermore to the interaction dy amics of these structural, institu-
tional, situational, framing and action-oriented factors of influence which tend to mutu-
ally reinforce their impact on the innovation process appears to be a reasonable con-
ceptual assumption. Without their substantial description, however, the conclusion that 
these interaction dynamics essentially underly the innovation process studied remains 
only a plausible hypothesis not tested by empirical reconstruction and evaluation. 
                                         
28 At least one of the referees of the project proposal emphasized the necessarily limited impact of the 
NI containing fertilizer to be developed on nitrate washout in soil and groundwater. 
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8 Typical features and summarizing conclusions 
This final section tries to summarize the main characteristics of the case study and to 
draw corresponding conclusions. 
1. The situational combination of organisationally entrenched self-inter sts, namely 
for BASF to develop sophisticated fertilizers in order to remain competitive on the 
fertilizer market, and for the BMBF to push promising environmental technology 
development in order to improve competitiveness of German industries, led to the 
initiation and formulation of a jointly funded R&D project to develop eco-efficient 
fertilizers. The head of PTWT utilised this window of opportunity to launch the 
project in 1995. 
2. On the basis of past screening programs, intense literature analysis and available 
chemical facilities, BASF had good chances to detect a suitable NI by systematic 
screening efforts. Therefore, their subsequent monitoring and testing in DMPP 
containing fertilizer formulations was a rather straightfoward project of completing 
an incremental product innovation within a relatively well-defined technological 
trajectory between 1996 and 2000, where its effective management could minimize 
the resources and time needed till market introduction by optimally coordinating 
and synchronising the various activities to be performed by different actors. 
3. Just those types of actors with the scientific competences required belonged to a 
loose innovation network, which one could expect to participate in a cooperative 
R&D project with rather strict labour division well coordinated and co-funded by 
BASF as its key actor. 
4. The innovation process met no serious obstacles in its technical and its social 
dimension, though finally some retardation in its time dimension due to the initial 
(incidental) coupling of the registration of the new DMPP containing fertilizer with 
the intended, but again and again delayed amendment of the German fertilizer 
ordinance. Willingness to compromise was prevalent in case of diverging actor 
interests (for instance: small separate mendment of the fertilizer ordinance; 
development of additional small-scale analytical methods for university institutes 
with deficient equipment in measuring instruments; location of the new fertilizer 
production plants), and substantial controversy could be hardly found in the whole 
innovation process. 
5. There was also a clear labour division of policies concerned by the fertilizer 
development project. Respective actors in environmental, technology, and 
agricultural policy (BMU, BMBF, BML) cared for more or less appropriate framework 
conditions of the innovation project but were hardly involved themselves in the 
genuine innovation network. No serious attempts of substantive EP/ETP interpolicy 
coordination could be observed. At the concrete project level, this probably might 
just have led to additional bureaucracy with subsequent time-d lays. At the level of 
appropriate framework conditions, there is clearly space for improved EP/ETP 
coordination stimulating environmental protection in agriculture. 
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6. The innovation offers a technical-fix solution to combine effective fertilizer 
application in modern agriculture and horticulture with environmental protection by 
ammonium stabilisators without (significant) (eco-) t xicological effects. 
7. Altogether the R&D project studied can be seen as a rather ideal-type case of a 
well-defined successful environmental innovation with good market chances. 
Usually this cannot be expected under ordinary (chaotic) circumstances of typically 
rather diverging actor interests, perceptions and strategies, even if innovative 
orientations already prevail in environmental man gement. 
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